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Abstract 
    We analyze in this study investor trading behavior based not on information 
related assumptions but on the search model of Vayanos and Wang (2007). Our study 
shows that search cost dictates trading polarization across investors, firm size and 
time of day. We find that individual investors prefer to trade at market open, while 
institutional investors trade more heavily near market close. Trading costs indicate 
that it is less costly for institutional investors to trade large cap stocks at market close 
than at open. Search cost is related significantly to order-based market liquidity 
measures depending on time of day, market capitalizations and investor type.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Trading liquidity of investors has been studied more in literature as the popularity of 
order-driven trading mechanism rises. While a poorer liquidity measure, such as higher bid-ask 
spread, is considered a result of less active trading, Foucault, Moinas, and Theissen (2007) argued 
that limit order book provides information on future volatility in the market. A leading theory of 
liquidity is based on asymmetric information. Many studies, including Glosten and Milgrom (1985), 
suggest that wider bid-ask spread in a specialist market is often used to compensate against 
information disadvantage. Information argument, however, does not apply in many situations, such 
as in an emerging market, where individual investors are the majority, trading preference in timing 
and stock characteristics is closely related to investor type. Individual investors prefer to trade small 
cap stocks not because of its poor informational content or low transparency in corporate 
governance, but due to their lower price and hence smaller amount of funds needed to trade a given 
quantity. We show in this study that individual investors prefer to trade relatively small cap stocks 
right after market opens, while foreign institutional investor (FII) and domestic institutional investor 
(DII) tend to trade large cap stocks more heavily near market close, for reasons unrelated to 
information. 
Vayanos and Wang (2007, VW) introduced a search-based model of asset trading, where search 
or trading cost differs and investors are constrained financially. In a search-based equilibrium of 
VW, liquidity in a specific market, measured by search costs, can be the result of investor 
characteristics, regulations and local custom, rather than information or diversification. In such an 
equilibrium, buyers anticipating to find a matching seller easily are willing to pay a higher price 
than in an otherwise situation. Sellers, while knowing this, would submit orders with more 
dispersed offer prices, as a form of economic rent, on the limit book. Order-based liquidity measure 
such as offer price dispersion, limit book depth and bid-offer difference can thus be considered as 
reflecting the economic rent. 
We attempt to analyze in this study investor trading behavior in a stock market without relying 
on any information related presumptions. Specifically, we analyze in the study how different types 
of investor choose when to trade in any given trading day, and provide explanations to it based on a 
search model of trading according to VW. Our study shows that comparative advantage in search 
cost dictates a polarization of trading activity across investors, firm size and time of day. We find 
that, in the Taiwan stock market, individual investors prefer to trade right after market opens, but 
foreign and domestic institutional investors trade more heavily near market close. From the 
  3
perspective of search equilibrium, search cost is related significantly to order-based market liquidity 
measures depending on time of day, market capitalizations and investor type. The results is a 
compromise between how easy it is to locate a counterparty and how much execution cost an 
investor is willing to accept given the distribution of order book at certain juncture. 
 We study intraday trading behavior involving search cots across individuals, foreign and 
domestic institutions. Our empirical results suggest that search cost is low during market opening 
period and goes down afterward. Individuals’ search cost is low especially in trading small cap 
stocks at market open, while search cost for foreign and domestic institutions is relatively low in 
trading large cap stocks near market close. Yang and Zhang (2007) showed how marginal 
institutional investors engage in short-term trading due to cost factors compared to other 
institutional investor going after long-term values of stocks. The short horizon of a marginal FII 
may have induced them to concentrate in trading stocks with the said characteristics.  
The main implication of our results would help, on the one hand, investors in general to locate 
at any given period the most cost-efficient market to trade, which lowers average trading cost and 
enhance market trading volume1. On the other hand, our analysis contributes to regulators as well as 
exchanges if certain extreme search environment entails ramification or any other actions. 
Unnecessary market alarms could be greatly reduced and market efficiency is thus improved. A 
brief literature review and discussion of how to measure search cost, as well as order-based liquidity, 
are given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. Conclusion is given in 
Section IV. 
 
II. How does search activity affect trading? 
 
The competitive equilibrium of informed trading introduced by Back, Cao and Willard (2000) 
suggests that heavy trading occurs when informed traders compete in aggressive trading with 
correlated information when market opens, where more market depth is observed than the rest of 
the session. As market approaches its close, trading becomes heavy again as informed traders 
aggressively exploit their remaining private information. This model explains in part intraday 
trading patterns, as well as trading concentration. Hu (2006) suggests that an information-only 
argument is more applicable in quote-driven markets where trade initiation reflects nature of 
information. In an order-driven market, dynamic frictional costs, in the sense of Stoll (2000), have 
to be taken into account. Hu (2006) find that frictional costs are the smallest at market open, 
consistent with our findings on the polarization of trading activity. 
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In emerging financial markets, turnover and market volume are often generated by individual 
investors. Trading of individuals is worth studying in these markets as it interacts much with 
institutional investors, as suggested in Barber, Odean and Zhu (2009), and Dorn, Huberman and 
Sengmueller (2008). Ahmed, Rosser and Uppal (2010) also reported that there are excessive rapid 
price movements in emerging stock markets. Zhou, Geppert and Kong (2010) concluded that 
trading strategies contributed to profits in the China market. Ting (2009) indicated that, within a 
given period, foreign institutional in Taiwan tend to follow those with a higher turnover rate.  
Diamond (1982) first studied search models first in labor economics. Duffie, Gˆarleanu, and 
Pedersen (2002) use a search-based model to study its impact on asset prices and securities lending 
Vayanos and Wang (2007) extended it into a risk-neutral framework. Duffie, Gˆarleanu, and 
Pedersen (2005) show that search frictions have different implications for bid-ask spreads than do 
information frictions. Vayanos and Weill (2008) presented a search model, extending the argument 
of VW we refer in this study, studying different prices for on-the-run and off-the-run US treasury 
securities. 
Search Model of Trading 
 VW proposed a model with two assets traded in two markets respectively. More trading could 
be generated by shorter horizons as it reduces search times and trading costs. Switching rates could 
correspond to buyers’ characteristics, such as long horizon is more relevant to insurance companies, 
while shorter ones belong to hedge funds. A clientele equilibrium is where one market not only has 
more sellers, but also more buyers as well as a higher buyer-seller ratio than the other. Moreover, 
the price in the more active market is thus higher and buyers’ search times are shorter. Investors 
with high switching rates, who have a stronger preference for short search times, prefer the more 
active market despite the higher prices. On the other hand, low-switching-rate investors, who are 
more patient, value more the lower prices in the less active market. So in essence, cost 
characteristics of investors determine concentration of trading and prices, rather than information 
about the assets. Individual investors trading for own accounts with unleveraged funds are supposed 
to have lower switching rates and prefers a less active market. However, when market moves fast, 
lack of knowledge could elevate their switching rates so they turn to the other market instead.  
Although FII’s hold about one third of the total values of Taiwanese stocks, their overall 
turnover rate is in general at around 10% monthly only. The positive relation between holdings and 
turnover within given periods presented by Ting (2009) suggest that marginal FII’s are incurring 
risk-adjusted cost situation as discussed in Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2007). These marginal FII’s 
are under shorter horizons due to liquidity reasons related to allocating funds across borders.  
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A measure of order dispersion 
Two forms of liquidity measures will be used in this study. Both of them are based on order 
prices submitted to the market. Limit order book dispersion describes the tightness of the book by 
examining how far apart from each other (or from the mid-quote) the limit orders are placed in the 
book. Foucault, Kadam, and Kandel (2005) suggest that the limit order book dispersion is linked 
with the patience of limit order traders. We adopt the following measure by modifying the 
dispersion measure of Kang and Yeo (2008). The dispersion measure of stock i in a given day is 
defined as  
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where Ticki is the tick size of the respective stock. bjD is the price interval between the jth best buy 
order price and its next better order price, and similarly sjD  is that for the sell order price. The buy 
and sell price intervals, up to the fifth best limit orders are weighted by bjw  and 
s
jw , the size of the 
corresponding buy or sell limit orders. For the whole market, transaction prices are used to compute 
the first price interval, while for each type of investors, average of buy and sell order price at each 
priority level is used instead. This dispersion measure is designed to show how clustered or 
dispersed the limit orders are in the book. It measures how tightly orders are placed to each other or 
how closely they are to the mid-quote. The higher the dispersion is, the less tight the book is, and 
the lower amount of liquidity the limit order book provides.  
In the Taiwan market, due to funding liquidity, individual investors tend to hold and trade 
stocks with lower prices, while institutional investors concentrate more on high price stocks. 
Therefore, bjD
 
and sjD
 
in (1) are computed using the raw price distance divided by tick size of 
the stock, so that only the relative price distance is used, allowing iDsp  to be comparable across 
stocks and various types of investors. 
A measure of order book depth 
Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005) argue that informed traders would submit more limit 
orders than market orders in an electronic market. McKenzie (2007) argued that in the emerging 
markets especially the ability to forecast future price movements is related to the depth of those 
markets. Therefore, beside the tightness measure, limit order book helps examining how well the 
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book handles large volume of market orders. A deep limit order book can absorb a sudden surge in 
the demand of liquidity without inducing much price deviation. Without the interference of the 
specialist and before new limit orders can replenish the book, market buy (sell) orders will first be 
executed against the limit sell (buy) orders at the best offer (bid) quote. If the volume of the market 
order(s) is larger than the best offer (bid) size, the remainder of the unexecuted market orders will 
be executed against the limit orders queuing at the next best offer (bid) quote. In other words, large 
volume of market buy (sell) orders will walk up (down) the limit order book to get filled. The 
further away the market orders walk up or down the book, the larger the difference between the 
execution price and the mid-quote is, and therefore the more costly the trading process will be for 
the market order traders. Motivated by the mechanism described above, we design the cost-to-trade 
measure, which can be thought of as an enhanced depth measure for the limit order book.  
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where i=1,2,…,525. iMQ  is the midpoint of the nearest buy and sell quote prices, TNSi is the 
total number of shares traded within the time interval of interest, BkP  is the best bid price, 
S
kP  is 
the best offer price and,  
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III. Data and empirical results 
This study employs intra-day order book data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange starting from 
March 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2006, covering stocks of 525 firms over a period of 461 trading 
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days. Excluded from the complete pool of stocks listed on the exchange are those with irregularities 
and unusual exchange sanctions. As of today, the order matching system in the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange does not allow market order, so the limit order book covers the entire body of orders 
submitted by all investors. Each data record includes date, exact time in hours, minutes and seconds, 
stock code, price and quantity of all orders, filled or not, submitted during the data period. 
Individual stock returns, market capitalizations, daily turnover and price-book ratios are obtained 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
We divided each daily session, between 9:00 AM and 1:30 PM, into 9 intervals with 30 
minutes in each interval. This is because trading volume varies much across the day. Gunduz and 
Hatemi-J (2005) also suggested that, price and volume relation is important in emerging markets. 
As our data contains flags identifying each investor as either an individual, an FII or a DII, we are 
able to extend our analysis according to investor type. Over the last ten years, percentage of trades 
accounted for by FIIl has apparently grown much faster than the DII. As a matter of fact, FII’S 
owns one third of the total market capitalization and account for one quarter of daily volume as of 
end of 2008 in Taiwan. Table I reports the distribution of number of investors in each investor 
category across a typical trading day. There are more individuals and DII’s choosing to trade in the 
opening interval than in the rest of the day, while the closing interval is when the greatest number of 
FII’s appears. Table I also gives total number of orders submitted by the three types of investors for 
stocks of 525 firms averaged over the entire data period of 495 days. As the number of individuals 
is overwhelming, their orders are almost 10 times those of FII’S. On average, more than 22% of the 
individual orders are submitted during the first half hour of a regular four and half hour daily 
trading session, while only around 13% of orders from the other two types are placed in this period. 
In the last half hour period, numbers of orders as daily percentage are about the same. Trading in 
other periods is usually slower than open and close. Based on the distribution of orders submitted, 
FII’s appear more inclined to trade right before market close, while individuals and DII’s prefer to 
trade at market open. 
To further compare how investors choose a time to trade, we examine in Table II the average 
number of shares in each buy or sell order, for the entire session as well as the opening and the 
closing intervals. Although these two intervals are where we see the heaviest trading in any given 
day, the order size submitted by the market as a whole is larger right before market closes. Out of 
the three types of investors, FII is the only one submitting more heavily at market close, with order 
size averaging almost three times that in the opening period. However, the overwhelming number of 
individual investors placing orders in the opening interval generates 51% more individual’s orders 
than in the closing interval, as seen in Table I.  
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In order to identify where the heavier orders are allocated, we show in Table III the transaction 
volume of FII and DII across market capitalizations, as well as percentages of their holdings in the 
respective category of shares. In the category of shares with the lowest market cap, the market as a 
whole trades on average 6.63 thousand shares in any given stock and any day. But for shares in the 
largest market cap category, the average market trading volume is more than 7 times as much. FII’s, 
when they do trade, trade about 5.5 times that of market average in stocks with the smallest cap and 
135 times as much in stocks of the largest firms. DII’s also trade much more actively than market 
average, but not as much as FII’s. This difference is consistent with results in Table II as well as 
institutional holdings of outstanding shares of stocks in each capitalization category. FII’s trade 
extremely heavily on large cap stocks because they hold a substantial percentage of them. Despite 
the average order size is extremely large, the average trading volume for large cap stocks is still 
high, reflecting possible ease in finding counterparty.  
The model of VW provides a framework where search costs dictate market equilibrium and 
how active trading takes place there. Investors with shorter investment horizon would more likely 
choose to trade when more buyers and sellers are around, which leads to shorter search time. 
Equilibrium price should be higher than otherwise as buyer-seller ratio is also high there. Table IV 
gives summary statistics of measures consistent with the VW model. We consider BFT and SFT as 
proxies for search time of buy and sell orders respectively. The former is the average number of 
seconds it takes to fill a certain buy order within the period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a 
sell order. The distribution of BFT and SFT across the day indicates that search time at market open 
is the shortest during among all intervals, while search time is the longest when market is about to 
close. The sharp increase in search time across the day is not proportional to the number of active 
investors in each intraday interval as reported in Table I. Although search time decreases when firm 
size goes up, across the firm size quintile, buy order search time for small cap stocks still enjoys the 
greatest edge of 1 to 15.8 at market open against market close. For the largest cap, the edge reduces 
to only 7.3.      
Within the similar time-size block across time of day and firm size, BOC and SOC, the average 
numbers of buy and sell orders for any given stock submitted to the market, falls generally from 
market open to close. From the perspective of search equilibrium of VW, this suggests that search 
time is shorter at market open because there are more buyers and sellers at that time. However, the 
sharp rebound of BOC and SOC right before market closes only lowers BFT and SFT slightly. Buy 
order for the smallest cap concentrates disproportionally at market open with an average of 13 times 
that at market close. For the largest cap, buy and sell orders reach their maximums at market close, 
rebounding from the immediate preceding interval by 45% and 61% respectively. Although BOC is 
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greater than SOC, as market regularity, their ratio, BSR, also falls from open to close, consistent 
with the intraday distribution of search time in the sense of search equilibrium.  
BSD, defined as the difference between the best bid and offer price averaged across all 
incidences with a realized transaction price, over the intraday interval of interest. In a quote-driven 
market, this is equivalent to bid-ask spread quoted by a dealer. However, the intraday distribution of 
BSD is inconsistent with our natural expectation of bid-ask spread. In Table IV, BSD at market open, 
when trading is the heaviest, appears to be the highest than the rest of the day, and there is also a 
rebound right before market close. The correlation between BSD and market trading volume for the 
entire data period is, however, -0.24, conforming to common regularity. It is worth special attention 
that, for the smallest firms, the offer price difference is substantially higher than that for firms with 
large size in all intervals except in the opening one. Also, for the largest firms, BSD is significantly 
high at market open than in the rest of the day. Except for the two situations above, offer price 
difference generally falls from open to close and from low cap to high cap. BSD for the largest firms 
at market close enjoy nearly a global minimum across the time-size block, while only a local 
minimum is present for the smallest firms at market open. To the extent that BSD constitutes part of 
cost to order execution, its polarization within the time-size block in Table IV suggests that it is 
much less costly to trade stocks of the smallest firms at market open as well as stocks of the largest 
firms at market close. 
The unique polarized pattern of trades, at the upper left and lower right corners of the time-size 
block, in Table IV can be further clarified if we examine the block across major investor groups 
using more sophisticated measures constructed from the limit order book for the data period of the 
study. Table V reports the distribution of composite order price dispersion measure, OPD, using the 
same time-size blocks as in Table IV. As the computed value of measure is affected in practice by 
the arrival rate of orders within a given time, figures in the table is modified to reflect the 
percentage each cell in the block is above or below corresponding daily averages. Order price 
dispersion reported here follows a pattern opposite to that of search time in Table IV. OPD generally 
falls from open to close, but the difference between open and close decreases with firm size, similar 
to the case of search time. Taking investor type into consideration, we are able to see more 
prominent northwest-southeast block polarization, with OPD being polarized the most for 
individuals and the least for FII’s. In fact, order price dispersion goes up with firm size on orders 
submitted by FII’s and DII’s, contrary to the direction for individuals. Based on the summary 
statistics about trading activity given in Table I, the block distribution by investor type in Table IV 
suggests that, across time of day, order price dispersion benefits trading. But in the category of 
individuals, it benefits more when trading stocks of the smaller firms, while for institutional 
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investors higher dispersion benefits trading stocks of larger firms. This kind of clientele distribution 
of trading activity is not compatible with information-based explanation, especially why order price 
dispersion is higher, at market open, when trading is extremely heavy. However, if OPD is just a 
form of economic rent imposed by limit order traders to reflect the benefits each trader can enjoy 
through shorter search time, then the VW search equilibrium justifies why OPD should be 
negatively, rather than positively, related to search time. From this perspective, OPD has different 
implications from BSD, with the former serving as a necessary rather than sufficient condition for 
search-based trading concentration.  
Trading behavior of individuals has often been considered as different from that of institutional 
investors. Considered alternatively in a search-cost driven market, the divergence of trading 
behavior may still exist. In the view of VW, search cost is important because investors are 
constrained in choosing assets to hold or trade. In many of the emerging markets, individuals with 
limited funds tend to trade infrequently on small cap stocks whose low liquidity, to go after 
potentially higher returns. Institutional, especially foreign and western, investors possess ample 
funds, so they are also constrained to trade or hold large cap stocks for depth and the likelihood of 
finding counterparty. Unlike FII’s and DII’s, OPD for individuals in Table V indicate that their 
search time is actually longer when OPD is high. This implies placing limit orders on large cap 
stocks is very risky. The substantial low ratios between OPD at open and at close in low cap stocks 
for FII’s and DII’s, as compared with individuals, also suggest institutional investors tend to avoid 
submitting limit orders there2. Individuals facing funding constraints are always better of submitting 
limit orders. The clientele search equilibrium of VW justifies the existence of diagonal polarization 
of trading choices within a time-size block. Search costs cause different comparative advantage for 
individual as institutional investors. Individuals’ advantage is in small cap stocks at market open, 
while FII’s and DII’s in large cap stock near market close. 
According to Table VI, the distribution of the second order-price-based measure, though 
created to gauge depth of a limit order book, is also compatible with our findings in previous tables. 
CTT falls in general with both time of day and firm size, uniformly across all types of investors. 
Although stocks of larger firms possess better depth, orders from individuals have on average more 
depth than those from institutional investors. At market open, this edge is about 2.4 times, and 
increases to 3.9 times at market close. Along the direction of firm size, individuals’ edge in order 
book depth at market open is 2.1 times on small cap and 2.3 times on large cap, but is 3.7 times and 
2.7 times respectively at market close. So the results on order book depth measure in Table VI 
implies that it is in the interest of FII’s and DII’s to trade large cap stocks, especially at market close. 
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For individuals, order book depth indicated they should make the similar trading decision as the 
institutional investors to avoid higher execution cost in trading small cap stocks at market open. 
However, the search cost advantage dominates the execution cost. Apparently, for individuals 
finding a counterparty to complete an intended trade is more important than walking up a few ticks 
on the limit order book and paying for a slightly higher transacted price. After all, not being able to 
submit a market order in the Taiwan market is itself a strong protection against shallow limit order 
book. Besides, there is also a 7% price limit on either direction. Actual trading intensity may depend 
in part on the relative strength of search and execution costs. 
Based on a framework of time-size block, we have used search cost argument to support the 
observed diagonal polarization of trading activity among individual and institutional investors in the 
market. Comparative advantage causes investors to trade in a more beneficial environment than 
otherwise by weighing between search and execution costs. The relation is, however, on the level of 
broad categories. To determine on average what dictates search equilibrium at every incidence, we 
need to conduct further point estimation on search time and its driving factors. We use the following 
model to find out how order price dispersion affects actual time it takes to fill a buy order. A fixed 
effect panel regression based on 
 tktktktk BSDOPDBFT ,,2,1, εββα +++=   (3) 
is conducted, where BFT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV , and OPD is the same 
as that defined in (2). In (3), BSD is included as a control variable. Although the results in Table IV 
show that the pattern of BSD within the time-size block is contrary to that of BFT, Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) imply that BSD should be positively related to BSD. Table VII indicate that overall 
and for all major types of investors, BSD does affect BFT positively, with an exception in the 
opening interval. The explanation is related to the fact that, in Table IV, BSD happens to have a 
local minimum at the upper left hand corner of the time-size block. Within that cell, search factor is 
so strong that it drives up expectation for future offer price, hence current bid offer price difference. 
In Table VII, the coefficient for OPD is negative within the first two hours of trading for individuals. 
Larger order price dispersion, arising from the expectation of lower search cost, causes shorter 
execution time to fulfill that expectation in those periods. Later on as that expectation weakens, 
execution time is lengthened due to dispersed ordered prices which are hard to fill. Note that in 
Table VII the expectation effect from search factor can last till mid-session for individuals, 
indicating that it is more difficult to interpret a large limit order book. 
Similar analysis is conducted for SFT, the execution time for sell orders, according to the 
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following fixed effect panel regression model, 
tktktktk BSDOPDSFT ,,2,1, εββα +++=   (4). 
The results for the model above are reported in Table VIII, which are somewhat different from those 
for BFT as seen in VII. The coefficients for BSD in the case of both FII’s and DII’s are uniformly 
negative across the entire day. This suggests that their best offer price tend to increase faster than 
the best bid price, so sell orders can be filled faster even when BSD rises. Similar reason applies for 
the coefficients of OPD. Greater order price dispersion always makes it easier to execute an sell 
order, whether there are more or fewer institutional investors selling in the market.  
Model (3) is then modified for analysis, regardless of investor type, across firm size according 
to (5),    
tktktktktk BSDCTTOPDBFT ,,3,2,1, εβββα ++++=   (5). 
Table IX gives the results of (5), where coefficients for BSD and OPD are quite similar to those in 
Table VII. However, the effect of OPD in large caps last longer into the day. As institutional 
investors often place no more than two order prices, which vary rapidly, on either the bid or offer 
side, higher OPD on large cap orders could always suggest more active trading and hence shorter 
execution time. For the small cap stocks, higher OPD later on in the day is caused by more order 
price farther away from mid-quote, therefore it cannot help expediting execution when there are not 
enough individual investors. The coefficients for CTT reflect that for large caps near market close 
better order book depth intensifies the search cost advantage over the execution cost disadvantage, 
further affirming the polarized trading activity implied by Table IV. For the small caps, although 
search cost advantage also dominates the execution cost disadvantage in all but the first intraday 
intervals, weaker search effect would only generate less trading activity. It is worth noting that for 
medium cap stocks, CTT reflects only the search cost is present. Analysis on the effect of CTT on 
BFT in Table IX reveals that there is strong search cost effect only in the smallest cap at market 
open, and that there is ultra strong search effect which dominates execution effect in the largest cap 
near market close. The results in Table IX validate findings in Table VI. 
Model (4) is analyzed also again across firm size. Adding CTT to model (4) we have    
tktktktktk BSDCTTOPDSFT ,,3,2,1, εβββα ++++=   (6). 
Table X gives the results of (6), which are somewhat different from those in Table IX. The effect of 
OPD on SFT in large caps is about the same. However, for the small caps, higher OPD help 
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expediting execution, possibly due to offer price submitted closer to mid-quote. For large caps, the 
negative coefficients of CTT across all firm size suggest the dominance of search cost advantage 
over the execution cost disadvantage is uniform on sell orders. Execution costs of sell orders are 
largely unimportant as sell orders placed not far away from mid-quote, further clarifying the results 
in Table VIII. 
 
V. Conclusion 
This study presents a set of intra-day order book data to study trading behavior in the securities 
market. We adopted a search model specifically ideal for exploring our detailed order data. We 
attempt to analyze in this study investor trading behavior in a stock market without relying on any 
information related presumptions. Our study shows that comparative advantage in search cost 
dictates a polarization of trading activity across investors, firm size and time of day. We find that, in 
the Taiwan stock market, individual investors prefer to trade right after market opens, while foreign 
and domestic institutional investors trade more heavily near market close. Our analysis suggests that 
low search cost at market open induces individuals to trade at that time. High search cost near 
market close drives institutional investors to trade more before market closes. Trading costs implied 
by limit order book indicate that it is less costly for institutional investors to trade large cap stocks 
at market close than at open. From the perspective of search equilibrium, search cost is related 
significantly to order-based market liquidity measures depending on time of day, market 
capitalizations and investor type. In a typical trading day, order prices are more disperse as search 
time is low in earlier part of the session, later on the dispersion falls as search time rises. Individuals, 
who are constrained in choices, tend to take this advantage at market open more than the 
institutional, especially in buy orders for low cap stocks. The results is a compromise between how 
easy it is to locate a counterparty and how much execution cost an investor is willing to accept 
given the distribution of order book at certain juncture.  
Although we have presented valid arguments regarding the central issue of this study, there are 
areas we do have to work on to enrich our study with. We have yet to investigate further order 
submission detail in individual stocks to support the search cost model. Other analysis, such as 
trading motives of investors, evidence on sequence or development of trading concentration and the 
dynamics of search equilibrium could be added to an extension as well.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. This is indeed consistent with Hu (2006) where it was shown that the participation of individual 
investor helps reducing frictional costs. 
 
2. While constructing the measure of OPD, we examined in detail the limit order book and find that 
FII’s and DII’s rarely submit more than two bid or offer prices at any transaction even in the case of 
large cap stocks. There are no limit order prices at all for stocks not with the largest firm size. These 
are all indications of market order submission.   
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Table I Number of Investors in and Orders Submitted to the Taiwan Stock Market  
Averaged over 461 trading days, by type of investors and time of day 
Investor Type All day 9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 Number of Investors 
Individuals  253,996 245,869 240,691 236,557 232,882 229,559 228,973 234,169 249,891 
FII's  74,956 70,717 68,085 67,953 66,552 67,191 67,308 69,626 77,828 
DII's  69,744 51,066 41,556 37,051 35,713 34,596 32,481 34,370 51,786 
 Number of Orders 
Individuals 790,275 176,874 111,960  83,988  70,032  61,049  56,174  54,046  64,065  112,088  
FII's 84,086  11,273  8,883  8,174  8,166  8,146  8,455  8,876  10,201  11,912  
DII's 15,375  2,752  1,902  1,566  1,416  1,379  1,357  1,325  1,449  2,229  
 
 
 
Table II  Daily and Intra-day Buy and Sell Orders By Investor Type 
Averaged across 525 stocks and 461 days, in lots of thousand shares 
 All Day 9:00~9:30 13:00~13:30 
 Average size per order 
Investor Type Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell 
All 8.50 8.45 14.19 14.24 19.92 18.07 
Individual 7.29 7.36 10.54 11.12 9.76 10.18 
FII 17.10 17.34 27.12 26.18 69.19 59.72 
DII 26.23 24.59 37.64 28.77 29.26 26.87 
 
 
 
Table III  Trading Volume and Holding Percentages By Market Cap and Investor Type 
Averaged across 525 stocks and 461 days, volume in lots of thousand shares 
 All FII’s DII’s 
Market Caps  Volume Holdings Volume Holdings 
 1 (smallest) 6.63 36.62 3.50% 11.19 .28% 
 2 6.63 36.62 4.44% 11.19 1.23% 
 3 12.09 153.23 7.71% 63.41 2.33% 
 4 18.81 568.70 13.40% 200.25 2.82% 
 5 (largest) 48.76 6598.87 25.60% 498.83 2.68% 
 17 
Table IV  Summary Statistics of Intraday Indicators for VW Search Equilibrium 
Sample means across 525 firms over 461 trading days 
 
Indicators used in this study to explore the search equilibrium in VW include search time, number of buy and sell orders 
and buyer/seller ratio. The search times of buy and sell orders are proxied by, BFT and SFT respectively. The former is 
the average number of seconds it takes to fill a buy order within the period of interest, while the latter is that to fill a sell 
order. Average numbers of buy and sell orders submitted to the market are denoted by BOC and SOC. BSR is the ratio 
between total buy and sell orders for a given stock on a given day, and is used to proxy the buyer to seller ratio in VW. 
BSD is the difference between the best bid and offer price in the market, averaged over the time period of interest. 
 
Market 
Caps1 
9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 BFT 
All 125 348 575 783 942 1,072 1,271 1,451 1,440 
1 125 445 741 1,017 1,249 1,439 1,705 1,958 1,970 
2 127 397 657 897 1,088 1,238 1,478 1,706 1,698 
3 125 340 565 776 930 1,058 1,271 1,446 1,440 
4 124 316 518 703 841 959 1,140 1,286 1,250 
5 123 260 420 564 663 738 847 940 906 
 SFT 
All 101 252 371 468 574 687 722 725 736 
1 103 310 454 575 708 845 914 923 1,043 
2 102 267 392 491 596 722 756 758 793 
3 99 244 356 442 548 649 670 667 651 
4 102 233 342 435 526 634 656 662 640 
5 100 218 327 415 512 614 650 646 588 
 BOC 
All 145 73 56 48 42 40 38 44 67 
1 143 13 10 8 7 7 6 7 11 
2 140 30 23 19 17 15 14 16 25 
3 150 59 44 37 36 30 27 21 50 
4 148 83 62 52 45 42 39 46 70 
5 143 181 140 122 109 105 104 121 176 
 SOC 
All 141 69 53 45 40 37 37 43 73 
1 139 13 10 8 7 6 6 7 12 
2 135 29 22 18 16 14 13 16 28 
3 143 55 41 34 30 27 26 31 54 
4 142 78 58 48 43 39 38 44 77 
5 144 170 134 117 105 99 102 119 192 
 BSR 
All 1.3691 1.2834 1.2708 1.2631 1.2741 1.3124 1.2175 1.1515 0.9577 
1 1.3746 1.2500 1.2046 1.1797 1.1771 1.1933 1.1215 1.0483 0.9650 
2 1.3987 1.2668 1.2574 1.2420 1.2535 1.2997 1.2034 1.1200 0.9290 
3 1.3882 1.2743 1.2560 1.2689 1.2846 1.3304 1.2173 1.1500 0.9374 
4 1.3735 1.3175 1.3217 1.3186 1.3322 1.3749 1.2685 1.2082 0.9658 
5 1.3108 1.3038 1.3044 1.2926 1.3060 1.3418 1.2586 1.2138 0.9907 
 BSD2 
All 1.9708 1.7049 1.6313 1.5959 1.5732 1.5598 1.5546 1.5661 1.5996 
1 1.9581 2.6617 2.4975 2.4158 2.3587 2.3208 2.3058 2.3163 2.3711 
2 1.9620 1.8960 1.8045 1.7597 1.7353 1.7182 1.7099 1.7209 1.7560 
3 1.9398 1.5210 1.4656 1.4425 1.4290 1.4255 1.4193 1.4245 1.4464 
4 1.9754 1.4140 1.3745 1.3581 1.3472 1.3455 1.3438 1.3481 1.3681 
5 2.0185 1.1581 1.1404 1.1339 1.1298 1.1293 1.1294 1.1305 1.1415 
1. Firms with the lowest market capitalization is assigned with 1, while the largest firms are assigned with 5.  
2. Measured in number of ticks.
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Table V  Summary Statistics of Intraday Order Dispersion Relative to Daily Average 
Across 525 firms over 461 trading days 
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where i=1,2,…,525 and Ticki is the tick size of the respective stock. )( 1, ijjiBij BidBidD −= − , which is the price 
interval between the jth best bid order price and the  next better quote, whereas )( 1, ijjiSij OfferOfferD −= − , which 
is the price interval between the jth best offer order price and the next better quote, with. ijw  being the size of the 
corresponding bid or offer order. As the computed value of measure is affected in practice by the arrival rate of orders 
within a given time, figures in the table is modified to reflect the percentage each cell in the block is above or below 
corresponding daily averages. 
 
Market 
Caps* 
9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 All Investors 
All 20.50% 5.63% 0.72% -1.74% -3.46% -4.51% -5.33% -5.78% -6.03% 
1 30.57% 10.19% 2.16% -2.22% -5.19% -`7.18% -8.59% -9.56% -10.18% 
2 25.19% 7.16% 0.98% -2.15% -4.45% -5.66% -6.63% -7.16% -7.38% 
3 20.35% 5.04% 0.40% -1.80% -3.36% -4.35% -5.15% -5.47% -5.66% 
4 17.03% 4.04% 0.18% -1.59% -2.86% -3.55% -4.18% -4.45% -4.62% 
5 9.36% 1.71% -0.13% -0.95% -1.52% -1.81% -2.11% -2.25% -2.30% 
 Individuals 
All 20.20% 5.79% 0.85% -1.64% -3.39% -4.43% -5.28% -5.83% -6.26% 
1 30.40% 10.18% 2.21% -2.19% -5.16% -`7.15% -8.59% -9.59% -10.11% 
2 24.95% 7.21% 1.06% -2.08% -4.28% -5.60% -6.64% -7.23% -7.41% 
3 19.87% 5.12% 0.52% -1.67% -3.26% -4.23% -5.04% -5.49% -5.81% 
4 16.16% 4.17% 0.38% -1.37% -2.70% -3.35% -3.99% -4.41% -4.88% 
5 9.62% 2.27% 0.09% -0.88% -1.57% -1.82% -2.17% -2.46% -3.08% 
 FII’s 
All 8.97% 3.38% 0.82% -0.66% -1.78% -2.53% -3.08% -3.03% -2.09% 
1 0.22% 0.09% -0.00% -0.04% -0.05% -0.08% -0.10% -0.08% 0.04% 
2 0.90% 0.46% 0.16% -0.01% -0.19% -0.31% -0.39% -0.39% -0.24% 
3 3.00% 1.38% 0.49% -0.09% -0.60% -0.97% -1.24% -1.20% -0.77% 
4 7.73% 3.36% 1.12% -3.63% -1.52% -2.39% -2.97% -2.99% -1.20% 
5 32.97% 11.62% 2.31% -2.80% -6.53% -8.90% -10.69% -10.52% -7.47% 
 DII’s 
All 11.41% 3.72% 0.46% -1.22% -2.46% -3.18% -3.40% -2.81% -2.53% 
1 1.17% 0.52% 0.15% -0.06% -0.18% -`0.29% -0.29% -0.23% -0.80% 
2 3.25% 1.37% 0.33% -0.25% -0.78% -1.04% -1.04% -0.76% -1.09% 
3 7.54% 2.73% 0.41% -0.83% -1.76% -2.26% -2.45% -1.80% -1.57% 
4 15.09% 5.47% 0.97% -1.42% -3.25% -4.37% -4.79% -4.11% -3.59% 
5 30.02% 8.55% 0.46% -3.57% -6.33% -7.95% -8.43% -7.16% -5.60% 
* Firms with the lowest market capitalization is assigned with 1, while the largest firms are assigned with 5.  
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Table VI  Summary Statistics of Intraday Cost-To-Trade Relative to Daily Average 
Across 525 firms over 461 trading days 
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where i=1,2,…,525. iMQ  is the midpoint of the nearest buy and sell quote prices, TNSi is the total number of shares 
traded within the time interval of interest, BkP  is the best bid price, 
S
kP  is the best offer price and,  
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Market 
Caps* 
9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 All Investors (x1000) 
All 13.0079 9.8449 8.6888 8.1036 7.6669 7.3865 7.1746 7.0736 6.9958 
1 17.8589 14.1373 12.5737 11.7438 11.1532 10.7470 10.4468 10.1948 9.9790 
2 14.1931 10.6952 9.4177 8.7636 8.2676 7.9675 7.7290 7.6085 7.5207 
3 12.3820 9.2101 8.0962 7.5566 7.1474 6.8688 6.6576 6.5776 6.5194 
4 11.4488 8.4558 7.4450 6.9397 6.5596 6.3176 6.1297 6.0875 6.0521 
5 9.1591 6.7281 5.9134 5.5160 5.2082 5.0333 4.9114 4.9011 4.9092 
 Individuals (x1000) 
All 13.3955 10.4136 9.2868 8.7193 8.2999 8.0390 7.8118 7.6603 7.5285 
1 18.0690 14.3891 12.8305 11.9916 11.3952 10.9884 10.6776 10.4073 10.2155 
2 14.2668 10.8553 9.5973 8.9522 8.4784 8.1937 7.9314 7.7879 7.7046 
3 12.6287 9.5807 8.4841 7.9552 7.5623 7.2972 7.0700 6.9430 6.8464 
4 11.9329 9.2087 8.2513 7.7756 7.4143 7.2065 7.0072 6.9023 6.7844 
5 10.0826 8.0364 7.2727 6.9234 6.6509 6.5103 6.3740 6.2626 6.0931 
 FII’s (x1000) 
All 31.6742 30.7326 30.2594 29.9569 29.6639 29.4932 29.3019 29.3110 29.4198 
1 38.2287 38.1884 38.1322 38.0976 38.0382 38.0152 38.0066 38.0051 38.0210 
2 38.4410 38.2997 38.2193 38.1541 38.0731 38.0783 37.9811 37.9710 38.0837 
3 30.5419 30.2111 30.0790 30.0179 29.8711 29.7989 29.7067 29.7387 29.9595 
4 25.5691 25.8143 25.3715 25.1059 24.8172 24.6598 24.4530 24.4801 24.8677 
5 24.5935 21.1536 19.4991 18.4132 17.5244 16.9181 16.3665 16.3646 16.1717 
 DII’s (x1000) 
All 35.3645 32.8618 31.9597 31.4973 31.0950 30.8792 30.8544 31.1076 30.5155 
1 49.1130 48.7376 48.5554 48.3584 48.2354 48.1506 48.1809 48.2515 47.0022 
2 38.9963 38.0760 37.6922 37.4903 37.2298 37.1191 37.1422 37.3311 36.4473 
3 33.0821 31.3160 30.5527 30.2103 29.8196 29.6622 29.6451 29.9616 29.5253 
4 30.7961 27.2124 25.8983 25.2023 24.6050 24.2437 24.0973 24.4305 24.1344 
5 24.8420 18.9749 17.1083 16.2339 15.5939 15.2289 15.2152 15.5719 15.4765 
 * Firms with the lowest market capitalization is assigned with 1, while the largest firms are assigned with 5.  
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Table VII  Intraday Search Time Effects on Buy Order by Investor Type 
Fixed-effect panel estimation, all investor types 
A search equilibrium is characterized by shorter search time is accompanied by better liquidity and 
higher prices in the market. To further explore this relation across different intraday intervals and firm 
size, we performed a panel regression with fixed effect based on  
tktktktk BSDOPDBFT ,,2,1, εββα +++= , 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. BFT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV, and OPD 
is the same as that defined in Table V. 
 
 9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 Whole Market 
β1 -0.0190* -0.4043** -0.5120** -0.3004** -0.2686** -0.0795* 0.0995** 0.3939** 0.6434** 
 (0.0095) (0.0199) (0.0279) (0.0330) (0.0365) (0.0377) (0.0367) (0.0334) (0.0297) 
β2 -0.0367** 0.0553** 0.0999* 0.1203** 0.1165* 0.1393** 0.1368** 0.1118** 0.0704** 
 (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0061) 
Obs 228,928 229,305 228,706 227,489 226,341 225,279 225,149 227,619 229,975 
 Individuals 
β1 -0.0209* -0.4005** -0.4699** -0.2968** -0.2477** 0.0682 0.1054** 0.3730** 0.5732** 
 (0.0095) (0.0192) (0.0267) (0.0316) (0.0350) (0.0361) (0.0351) (0.0320) (0.0285) 
β2 -0.0367** -0.0528** 0.0963 0.1193** 0.0115* 0.1387** 0.1366** 0.1131** 0.0736** 
 (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0061) 
Obs 228,954 229,305 228,706 227,489 226,341 225,279 225,149 227,619 229,975 
 FII’s 
β1 0.0086 -0.1280** -0.1223** -0.0213 -0.0145 0.0701* 0.1037** 0.1528** 0.0118** 
 (0.0085) (0.0155) (0.0222) (0.0270) (0.0296) (0.0302) (0.0285) (0.0257) (0.0219) 
β2 -0.0367** 0.0319** 0.0761** 0.1072** 0.1053** 0.1356** 0.1407** 0.1295** 0.1016** 
 (0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0059) 
Obs 228,954 229,305 228,706 227,489 226,341 225,279 225,149 227,619 229,975 
 DII’s 
β1 -0.0080 -0.1103** -0.1283** -0.0454 0.0432 0.0224 -0.0400 -0.0017 0.0191 
 (0.0077) (0.0138) (0.0202) (0.0245) (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0261) (0.0236) (0.0203) 
β2 0.0570 0.0319** 0.0762** 0.1073** 0.1056** 0.1357** 0.1415** 0.1302** 0.0059** 
 (0.1187) (0.0040) (0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0059) 
Obs 229,155 229,305 228,706 227,489 226,341 225,279 225,149 227,619 229,975 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses; ** denotes significant at 1% and * denotes significant at 5%. 
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Table VIII  Intraday Search Time Effects on Sell Order by Investor Type 
Fixed-effect panel estimation, all investor types 
A search equilibrium is characterized by shorter search time is accompanied by better liquidity and 
higher prices in the market. To further explore this relation across different intraday intervals and firm 
size, we performed a panel regression with fixed effect based on  
tktktktk BSDOPDSFT ,,2,1, εββα +++= , 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. SFT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV, and OPD 
is the same as that defined in Table V. 
 
 9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 Whole Market 
β1 -0.0008 -0.2014** -0.1973** -0.3455** -0.1108** -0.0991* -0.1859** -0.4977** -0.7404** 
 (0.0091) (0.0203) (0.0292) (0.0345) (0.0382) (0.0394) (0.0392) (0.0351) (0.0309) 
β2 -0.0724** -0.1132** -0.1253** -0.1411** -0.1240** -0.1467** -0.1356** -0.0720** 0.0461** 
 (0.0019) (0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0058) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0064) 
Obs 225,177 228,156 228,076 227,045 225,979 225,020 224,926 227,424 229,799 
 Individuals 
β1 0.0001 -0.1637** -0.1889** -0.3344** -0.1588** -0.1849 -0.2733** -0.5694** 0.7254** 
 (0.0091) (0.0195) (0.0279) (0.0309) (0.0366) (0.0376) (0.0374) (0.0336) (0.0296) 
β2 -0.0724** -0.1163** 0.1263 0.1425** 0.1223* 0.1433** 0.1321** 0.0692** 0.0456** 
 (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0052) (0.0057) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
Obs 225,203 228,156 228,076 227,045 225,979 225,020 224,926 227,424 229,799 
 FII’s 
β1 0.0026 -0.0827** -0.1059** -0.1910** -0.0587 -0.0481 -0.0845** -0.1362** -0.0983** 
 (0.0082) (0.0157) (0.0231) (0.0282) (0.0309) (0.0315) (0.0304) (0.0270) (0.0227) 
β2 -0.0724** -0.1250** -0.1345** -0.1560** -0.1284** -0.1508* -0.1435** -0.0947** -0.0101** 
 (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0062) 
Obs 225,203 228,156 228,076 227,045 225,979 225,020 224,926 227,424 229,799 
 DII’s 
β1 0.0134 -0.0524** -0.0179 -0.1229** -0.1105** -0.1459** -0.1619** -0.2724** -0.2750** 
 (0.0073) (0.0140) (0.0210) (0.0256) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0278) (0.0248) (0.0211) 
β2 -0.0746 -0.1249** -0.1345** -0.1557** -0.1279** -0.1497** -0.1424** -0.0932** 0.0119** 
 (0.1140) (0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0062) 
Obs 225,321 228,156 228,076 227,045 225,979 225,020 224,926 227,424 229,799 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses; ** denotes significant at 1% and * denotes significant at 5%. 
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Table IX  Intraday Search Time Effects on Buy Order by Firm Size (II)   
Fixed-effect panel estimation, all investor types 
A search equilibrium is characterized by shorter search time is accompanied by better liquidity and 
higher prices in the market. To further explore this relation across different intraday intervals and firm 
size, we performed a panel regression with fixed effect based on  
tktktktktk BSDCTTOPDBFT ,,3,2,1, εβββα ++++= , 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. BFT, OPD, CTT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV, 
OPD is the same as that defined in Table V, and CTT is the same as that defined in Table VI. 
 
 9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 Market Cap=1 (Smallest) 
β1 -0.0419** -0.2738** -0.3702** -0.3011** -0.1524* 0.0900 0.3671* 0.5179** 0.7713** 
 (0.0163) (0.0464) (0.0629) (0.0762) (0.0820) (0.0860) (0.0820) (0.0725) (0.0618) 
β2 0.9887* -12.771** -16.325** -20.625** -21.107** -27.666** -21.785** -27.559** -30.280** 
 (0.4234) (`1.4095) (`1.6870) (`1.8946) (2.0966) (2.2850) (2.2330) (2.2285) (2.2187) 
β3 -0.0333** -0.0439** 0.1016** 0.1333** 0.1352** 0.1785** 0.1523** 0.1541** 0.1242** 
 (0.0042) (0.0115) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0159) (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0154) 
 Market Cap=2 
β1 -0.0252 -0.5517** -0.6281** -0.2444** -0.3136** -0.0052 0.0417 0.5539** 0.55950** 
 (0.0210) (0.0438) (0.0609) (0.0711) (0.0792) (0.0817) (0.0802) (0.0720) (0.0620) 
β2 0.4758 4.5081** -0.4968 -7.4890** -10.043** -10.019** 12.172** -12.694** -12.759** 
 (0.6262) (1.4591) (1.7796) (2.0260) (2.2435) (2.4305) (2.4806) (2.4586) (2.4828) 
β3 -0.0507** 0.0655** 0.1194** 0.1893** 0.1670** 0.1929** 0.1882** 0.1552** 0.1063** 
 (0.0042) (0.0131) (0.0153) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0182) 
 Market Cap=3 
β1 -0.0104 -0.5359** -0.5950** -0.4035** -0.3215** -0.3004** -0.1449 -0.2823** 0.5512** 
 (0.0238) (0.0429) (0.0598) (0.0696) (0.0785) (0.0813) (0.0786) (0.0726) (0.0663) 
β2 -0.4021 18.6389** 18.9507** 13.9461** 7.5927** 12.1156** 2.8241 5.3621* 9.5839** 
 (0.8123) (1.4429) (1.7944) (2.2024) (2.2261) (2.24433) (2.4850) (2.5175) (2.6063) 
β3 -0.0392** 0.0506** 0.1456** 0.1861** 0.2028** 0.335** 0.2388** 0.1919** 0.1620** 
 (0.0042) (0.0136) (0.0199) (0.0175) (0.0188) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0255) 
 Market Cap=4 
β1 -0.0426 -0.5099** -0.5583** -0.3138** -0.3580** -0.2376** -0.0827 0.0995 0.4741** 
 (0.0210) (0.0438) (0.0631) (0.0739) (0.0826) (0.0843) (0.0842) (0.0771) (0.0717) 
β2 0.7200 20.1114** 17.4318** 13.9524** 8.4216** 9.3327** -1.1557 -1.0602 1.1527 
 (0.9012) (1.3871) (1.7499) (1.9864) (2.2042) (2.3554) (2.4184) (2.4372) (2.5400) 
β3 -0.0308** 0.0718** 0.1274** 0.1548** 0.1777** 0.1878** 0.2382** 0.2414** 0.1727** 
 (0.0041) (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0179) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) 
 Market Cap=5 (Largest) 
β1 0.0445 -0.4068** -0.7751** -0.4486** -0.5954** -0.6978** -0.3341** -0.2686** 0.2366* 
 (0.0372) (0.0562) (0.0789) (0.0923) (0.1041) (0.1060) (0.1037) (0.0996) (0.0971) 
β2 -2.6756 8.9855** 12.0087** 4.3972** 1.0497 -2.1917 -7.1827** -17.024** -6.4493** 
 (1.3749) (1.6531) (2.1629) (2.4560) (2.7349) (2.9089) (2.9726) (3.6724) (3.2807) 
β3 -0.0304** 0.1543** 0.1813** 0.2674** 0.3065** 0.3149** 0.3334** 0.3500** 0.3043** 
 (0.0040) (0.0128) (0.0151) (0.0164) (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0198) 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses; ** denotes significant at 1% and * denotes significant at 5%. 
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Table X  Intraday Search Time Effects on Sell Order by Firm Size (II)   
Fixed-effect panel estimation, all investor types 
A search equilibrium is characterized by shorter search time is accompanied by better liquidity and 
higher prices in the market. To further explore this relation across different intraday intervals and firm 
size, we performed a panel regression with fixed effect based on  
tktktktktk BSDCTTOPDSFT ,,3,2,1, εβββα ++++= , 
where t=1,…,461 and k=1,…,525. SFT, OPD, CTT and BSD are the same as those defined for Table IV, 
OPD is the same as that defined in Table V , and CTT is the same as that defined in Table VI. 
 
 9:00~    
9:30 
9:30~  
10:00 
10:00~ 
10:30 
10:30~ 
11:00 
11:00~ 
11:30 
11:30~ 
12:00 
12:00~ 
12:30 
12:30~ 
13:00 
13:00~ 
13:30 
 Market Cap=1 (Smallest) 
β1 0.0126 0.0132 0.1097 0.1575* 0.2569** 0.2950** 0.0665 -0.1003** 0.0436** 
 (0.0157) (0.0473) (0.0656) (0.4788) (0.0848) (0.0893) (0.0865) (0.0763) (0.0647) 
β2 -0.6152 -11.815** -19.159** -19.952** -27.596** -26.699** -28092** -27.167** -11.928** 
 (0.4074) (1.4468) (1.7653) (1.9652) (2.1769) (2.3776) (2.4624) (2.3483) (2.3282) 
β3 -0.0696** -0.0925** -0.0798** -0.0955** -0.0433** -0.0896** -0.0748** -0.0266 0.0043** 
 (0.0042) (0.0119) (0.0140) (0.0154) (0.00165) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0171) (0.0161) 
 Market Cap=2 
β1 -0.0150 -0.0436 -0.0023 -0.2130** 0.0098 -0.0816** -0.0786 -0.5454** -0.7587** 
 (0.0200) (0.0452) (0.0646) (0.0758) (0.0843) (0.0865) (0.0872) (0.0774) (0.0661) 
β2 0.4427 -9.6521** -24.864** -28.747** -32.130** -41.509** -41.414** -39.578** -19.621** 
 (0.5978) (1.5124) (1.8896) (2.1621) (2.3915) (2.5744) (2.6964) (2.6411) (2.6442) 
β3 -0.0765** -0.1053** -0.0473** -0.0745** -0.0375 -0.0082 -0.0060 0.0630** 0.1017** 
 (0.0042) (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0180) (0.0192) (0.0205) (0.0211) (0.0202) (0.0194) 
 Market Cap=3 
β1 -0.0065 -0.2892** -0.2779** -0.5128** -0.3625** -0.3653** -0.3483** -0.8880** -1.0974** 
 (0.0226) (0.0438) (0.0630) (0.0732) (0.0819) (0.0846) (0.0843) (0.0762) (0.0686) 
β2 0.5760 -8.0758** -25.377** -39.925** -40.943** -48.542** -44.495** -48.397** -32.061** 
 (0.7701) (1.4768) (1.8856) (2.1288) (2.3653) (2.5443) (2.6626) (2.6428) (2.6972) 
β3 -0.0737** -0.0241** 0.0526** 0.1052** 0.1103** 0.1158** 0.0822** 0.2221** 0.2853** 
 (0.0041) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.0184) (0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0213) (0.0208) (0.0203) 
2 Market Cap=4 
β1 0.0027 0.2608** -0.4636** -0.6977** -0.4043** -0.4157** 0.5424** 0.7965** -0.9459** 
 (0.0251) (0.0448) (0.0657) (0.0772) (0.0863) (0.0879) (0.0891) (0.0800) (0.0737) 
β2 -1.6088 -11.631** -29.125** -42.274** -50.844** -54.392** -57.293** -52.102** -32.361** 
 (0.8664) (1.4195) (1.8282) (2.0745) (2.3014) (2.4549) (2.5593) (2.5292) (2.6123) 
β3 -0.0665** 0.0258 0.1005** 0.1702** 0.2060** 0.2082** 0.2434 0.2547 0.03224 
 (0.0041) (0.0133) (0.0160) (0.0176) (0.0187) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0196) (0.0195) 
 Market Cap=5 (Largest) 
β1 0.0023 -0.4455** -0.3595** -0.9100** -0.8235** -0.8944** -0.9173** -0.8227** -0.8662** 
 (0.0358) (0.0564) (0.0796) (0.0931) (0.1062) (0.1075) (0.1080) (0.1008) (0.0963) 
β2 2.6891* -17.828** -42.420** -62.469** -65.726** -77.145** -85.173** -75.937** -66.325** 
 (1.3225) (1.6588) (2.1811) (2.4771) (2.7921) (2.9493) (3.0959) (3.1028) (3.2541) 
β3 -0.0755** -0.1826** 0.2741** 0.3038** 0.3325** 0.3578** 0.4059** 0.4076** 0.4792** 
 (0.0040) (0.0128) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0179) (0.0186) (0.0192) (0.0193) (0.0196) 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses; ** denotes significant at 1% and * denotes significant at 5%. 
 
